US-Iran nuclear deal odds: is Yes at 11.5¢ on Polymarket value?
Polymarket prices “US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by December 31, 2026?” at 11.5¢ — an 11.5% market-implied probability — and our independent estimate is 13.5%, a 2-point edge that does not clear the noise threshold on a contract quoting 11 bid at 12 offer. The mispricing in this complex is not the December leg. It is the single penny separating it from the contract next door.
The 60-day negotiating window created by the June 2026 Islamabad memorandum of understanding expired on August 17, 2026 without an extension, and the nuclear talks it was meant to produce never began. Yes on the December contract has fallen from 47.5¢ on July 3 to 11.5¢ as of 08:13 UTC on August 19, 2026, including a 6-point drop in the past 24 hours (Polymarket). This Deep Dive walks the probability math, the term structure across the five calendar legs, and the one comparison that actually looks wrong.
Methodology: how we built the 13.5%
Three anchors, blended. First, a prerequisite chain: a signed instrument requires a meeting, so we take Polymarket’s own price for a qualifying US-Iran diplomatic meeting, interpolate a by-October-31 figure of roughly 37%, and apply a conditional deal probability of 30% drawn from how quickly the two sides produced paper in November 2013. Second, an interim-deal base rate rather than a comprehensive-accord base rate, because this market’s bar is far lower than a full treaty. Third, a coherence check against the two neighbouring nuclear contracts, which implies a materially higher number.
Weights are 50/20/30. The caveats are real: the conditional 30% is a judgement call, not a measured frequency; two of the five calendar legs trade on four-figure volume and cannot bear weight; and geopolitical estimates carry no equivalent of a sample size. Treat 13.5% as a central estimate inside a wide band.
The market, the price and the December 31 question
First, a date that needed resolving. Polymarket’s application programming interface returns an endDate field of September 30, 2026 for this contract, which contradicts its own title. The market’s published resolution criteria settle it: a qualifying instrument “must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET,” and the specified date in the question is December 31, 2026. The stale field is metadata inherited when the contract was cloned alongside its September sibling on June 26; the November and October legs, created later, carry correct dates. The deadline is December 31 — 134 days from this snapshot.
The bar is narrower than “a nuclear deal” in the headline sense but lower than a comprehensive accord. The rules require a written instrument, signed or formally adopted by both governments, establishing “at least one specific obligation limiting Iran’s nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested.” A cap on enrichment purity qualifies explicitly. A pledge not to pursue weapons does not. Anything “explicitly subject to a future agreement” does not. That last clause matters enormously: a framework announcing that talks will resume, which is the most plausible near-term diplomatic output, resolves this market No.
So is Yes at 11.5¢ value? On our numbers, marginally — and not by enough to call it a mispricing. Our 13.5% estimate sits 2 points above the 11.5% implied probability, on a contract quoting a full penny wide, in a complex where the underlying facts moved 6 points in a single session. A 2-point edge on an 11.5¢ contract is roughly 17% of the price in relative terms, which sounds substantial until you set it against a bid-offer that is 8.7% of the price and an estimate whose input uncertainty is far larger than either. The honest verdict is that the December leg is approximately fairly priced. What is not fairly priced, on our read, is the relationship between this contract and the two nuclear contracts sitting beside it — which is where the rest of this analysis goes.
The term structure: what the five calendar legs imply
Polymarket runs this question as a ladder of deadlines. Read together they produce something a single price cannot: the implied month-by-month hazard rate — the chance a deal lands in a given month given none has yet.
| Deadline | Yes price | Implied probability | Lifetime volume | Implied chance the deal lands in that month alone |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| August 31, 2026 | 0.65¢ | 0.65% | $4,097,704 | 0.65% |
| September 30, 2026 | 2.4¢ | 2.4% | $1,105,175 | 1.76% |
| October 31, 2026 | 6.0¢ | 6.0% | $79,229 | 3.69% |
| November 30, 2026 | 9.5¢ | 9.5% | $7,012 | 3.72% |
| December 31, 2026 | 11.5¢ | 11.5% | $1,655,865 | 2.21% |
Sources: Polymarket price snapshot, 08:13 UTC, August 19, 2026. Monthly figures are conditional hazard rates derived by the author from the cumulative prices — for example September, (2.4% − 0.65%) ÷ (100% − 0.65%) = 1.76%.
The shape is a hump: near-zero through August, rising to a plateau of roughly 3.7% per month across October and November, then falling away in December. That is defensible. It says the market expects a re-engagement window in the autumn and expects the year to close without paper if that window is missed. The one part we would push back on is the December decline, because deadlines are Schelling points in nuclear diplomacy — the 2013 interim deal landed on November 24 after a deadline, and the 2015 accord landed on July 14 after three separate extensions. Deals cluster at the buzzer.
But we will not build a thesis on it. The November leg has traded $7,012 in its lifetime and the October leg $79,229. Against $1.66m on December, those two are quotes rather than markets, and the kink between them is almost certainly a liquidity artefact.
“Insisting that Iran permanently forego enrichment is not necessary for an effective agreement and would only drive Iran from the negotiating table.”
The case for Yes: one penny for the only deal anyone has ever signed
Set the December contract against its neighbours and an inconsistency appears.
| Contract, December 31, 2026 deadline | Yes price | Implied probability | Lifetime volume | Our estimate | Edge (pp) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal | 11.5¢ | 11.5% | $1,655,865 | 13.5% | +2.0 |
| Iran agrees to end enrichment of uranium | 10.5¢ | 10.5% | $1,632,617 | 6.0% | −4.5 |
| Iran surrenders enriched uranium stockpile | 7.5¢ | 7.5% | $2,123,690 | 4.0% | −3.5 |
| US x Iran diplomatic meeting | 57.5¢ | 57.5% | $9,016 | 55.0% | −2.5 |
| Will the U.S. invade Iran before 2027? | 17.5¢ | 17.5% | $58,927,950 | 17.5% | 0.0 |
Sources: Polymarket price and volume snapshot, 08:13 UTC, August 19, 2026. Estimates are the author’s. No de-vig adjustment is applied: prediction-market contracts are quoted directly as probabilities, and the Yes and No legs here sum to 100 by construction.
Read the top two rows against each other. The “end enrichment” contract’s rules state that “agreements to merely limit or cap the level or quality of enrichment — such as reducing enrichment to below weapons-grade thresholds — will not qualify.” The “final deal” contract’s rules say the exact opposite: a cap on enrichment purity is offered as the worked example of a qualifying obligation. The two contracts therefore differ by precisely the capped-enrichment universe — and the market prices that entire universe at 1.0pp.
Why does that matter? Because capped enrichment is the only kind of nuclear limit these parties have ever actually signed. The November 2013 interim agreement capped Iranian enrichment at 5% and required dilution of the 20% stockpile. The 2015 accord capped it at 3.67%. Iran has never accepted zero, and its stated position has been that the principle of enrichment is not negotiable. Washington has demanded zero and has not got it. If the market genuinely believes there is a 10.5% chance Iran renounces all enrichment by year-end — and with $1.63m traded, that is not a stray quote — then internal consistency requires the broader deal contract to sit well clear of it, since almost every zero-enrichment world runs through a signed instrument and every capped world sits on top. On a strict reading that argues for something nearer 16% than 11.5%.
The gap is not perfectly clean, and we will not pretend otherwise. The enrichment contract can resolve Yes on a unilateral Iranian announcement with no American signature, so it is not strictly nested inside the deal contract. Its resolution source is a consensus of credible reporting rather than a published text. That loosens the arithmetic. It does not reverse it.
The case against: there is nothing to inspect
The steelman for 11.5¢ is stronger than the coherence argument, and it is why our estimate is 13.5% rather than 16%.
Start with the obvious: talks have not begun. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said the two sides “did not commence negotiations because the United States began violating the memorandum” (CBS News). Washington’s account is no warmer.
“There are no talks or conversations going on, or scheduled, with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Naval Blockade remains in full force and effect.”
The day before he told Fox News he had “no time schedule” and was “not in a hurry,” and he has since threatened to bomb Oman, the mediating state, over its separate transit arrangement with Tehran. Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, Kazem Gharibabadi, called the American position on the Strait of Hormuz a delusion. This is not a negotiation in a difficult phase. It is the absence of one.
Then the decisive structural point, and the one we think the coherence argument underweights. This market requires “a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested.” The IAEA stopped conducting verification activities in Iran after February 28, 2026. Inspectors have no access to enrichment sites, Iran denies access to 20 declared nuclear facilities, and the agency states plainly that it “cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran.” The last verified figures — 440.9 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched to 60% and 184.1 kg to 20% — predate the strikes. You cannot write a testable cap on a stockpile nobody can locate. Restoring verification is itself a months-long negotiation that has not started.
Add the timeline. The Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that technical negotiations on Iran’s nuclear file would prove difficult and that previous comprehensive accords took two years. The Arms Control Association called the memorandum “fundamentally, a non-nuclear deal that leaves key nuclear issues unresolved” — and even it would not have resolved this market Yes. That is the trap: the parties have already proved they can produce a signed document, and the document they produced still fails the test.
Where this bet breaks
The 13.5% estimate rests on assumptions that could fail. It breaks if any of these fire:
- No qualifying meeting by roughly October 31. Every path to a signed instrument runs through a room. The market for a meeting by September 30 sits at 24¢. If that leg is still under 20¢ entering October, the runway is gone and 13.5% is far too high — the residual would be closer to 5%.
- The IAEA remains locked out into the autumn. Without restored verification there is no mechanism to define a testable benchmark, and the rules explicitly reject vague commitments and anything conditional on future agreement. A public IAEA statement that access talks have failed would take our estimate below 8%.
- Washington re-anchors on zero enrichment. The Arms Control Association’s assessment is that this demand drives Iran from the table. If the administration formally restates it as a precondition, the capped-enrichment universe that carries most of our upside disappears.
- Escalation past the blockade. The invasion contract sits at 17.5¢ on $58.9m of volume. Any move from blockade to strikes on the mainland would collapse the diplomatic legs, and the deal contract would trade single digits regardless of the coherence argument.
- The price runs past 16¢ without a meeting occurring. Above that level the coherence argument is spent — 16% was the ceiling our own cross-market work produced, and paying more means paying for news that has not happened.
What to watch
The catalyst calendar is thin, which is itself the point: no scheduled round, no venue, no agenda. The nearest hard date is September 30, when the meeting contract and the September deal leg both expire and force a repricing across the ladder.
Three specific tells. First, venue chatter: Polymarket runs a separate market on where the next meeting happens, and Switzerland at 10.5¢ and Qatar at 5.5¢ are the leaders — movement in those legs would front-run any headline. Second, the Strait. Trump asserted on August 18 that “the Hormuz Strait is open and operating,” while the contract on traffic returning to normal by December 31 trades at 35.5¢ on $8.56m of volume; that divergence between the official line and the priced reality is worth more than either statement alone, and we covered the same disconnect in our Strait of Hormuz Deep Dive. Third, any IAEA announcement on restoring access.
One clarification on scope. This is a different contract from the one in our US invade Iran Deep Dive of July 30, which asked whether a 25¢ invasion price was too high and turned on force posture. This one turns on treaty text and verification access. The market now prices an American invasion at 17.5%, above the 11.5% it gives a signed deal — a striking statement about how the year is expected to end. See also our Israel next prime minister analysis.
FAQ
What are the odds of a US-Iran nuclear deal in 2026?
Polymarket’s “US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by December 31, 2026?” contract traded at 11.5¢ as of 08:13 UTC on August 19, 2026, an 11.5% market-implied probability, on $1,655,865 of lifetime volume and $291,470 of resting liquidity. That is down from 47.5¢ on July 3. The shorter-dated legs of the same ladder price August 31 at 0.65¢, September 30 at 2.4¢, October 31 at 6.0¢ and November 30 at 9.5¢.
Is Yes at 11.5¢ on Polymarket value?
Our independent estimate is 13.5%, implying a 2-point edge over the 11.5% market-implied probability. On a contract quoting 11 bid at 12 offer, with input uncertainty far wider than the edge itself, that does not meet our threshold for calling something mispriced. We read the December contract as approximately fairly priced and see the clearer dislocation in its relationship to the neighbouring enrichment contracts.
Why did the odds collapse in August 2026?
The 60-day negotiating window created by the June 2026 Islamabad memorandum of understanding expired on August 17, 2026 without an extension, and the nuclear talks it was meant to produce never began. Trump stated on August 18 that no talks were underway or scheduled; Iranian officials said American violations had rendered the deadline moot. Yes fell from 17.5¢ to 11.5¢ over that 24-hour period.
What actually counts as a deal for this market?
A written instrument signed or formally adopted by both governments containing at least one specific obligation limiting Iran’s nuclear programme through a concrete, measurable benchmark — a cap on enrichment purity is the rules’ own worked example. A pledge not to pursue weapons does not qualify. Neither does anything explicitly conditional on a future agreement, which rules out a framework merely announcing that talks will resume.
What would change the estimate?
A qualifying US-Iran diplomatic meeting is the single largest input; that contract sits at 24¢ for September 30. Restored IAEA access would raise the estimate materially, because without verification there is no mechanism to define the testable benchmark the rules demand. A formal American return to a zero-enrichment precondition, or escalation from naval blockade to strikes, would cut it sharply.
How does this differ from the US invade Iran market?
They are separate contracts with separate resolution criteria. The invasion market, at 17.5¢ on $58.9m of volume, turns on American military action before 2027. This one turns on a signed diplomatic text and its verification language. The market currently rates an invasion 6 points more likely than a deal over broadly the same horizon.
This article is informational analysis only and is not betting or financial advice. Odds and prediction-market prices move constantly; every price quoted is a timestamped snapshot, not a live line. There is no such thing as a guaranteed bet — past results and model estimates do not guarantee outcomes. Do your own research.
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